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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1954
under the terms of the lease the lessee was entitled to full credit for the cost
of all repairs against the rental due, which, under the facts, relieved the
lessee from the obligation to pay any rental. Judge Skeel dissented because
he believed that when the lessee undertook to make the repairs he must
make them as quickly as possible and not extend them over a long period of
time to the prejudice of the lessor through the abatement of the rent for
an unreasonable period. The fact that one provision m a lease was con-
strued three different ways reveals the importance of the need for carefully
drafted leases.
ROBRT N. COOK
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Ordinance Regulating Length of Occupancy
In Trailer Camps
In 1940 the City of Brooklyn enacted an ordinance providing for a
comprehensive regulation of trailer camps within its boundaries, the most
controversial provision of which was a section forbidding occupancy
of a site in any trailer camp by a trailer or ats inhabitants for longer than
60 days, and further forbade its or -their return to the same or any other
camp in the city within 90 days after expiration of the 60-day period of
occupancy. In 1942 the constitutionality of the ordinance in general and of
this provision in particular was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court'
In 1951 the General Assembly enacted an act with respect to the regula-
tion of house-trailer parks2 and authorized -the Public Health Council -to
"make regulations to be of general application throughout the state govern-
ing the location, layout, construction, drainage, santation, safety and opera-
tion of house-trailer parks." In December of 1951 the Public Health Council
promulgated such comprehensive regulations.
It was urged by the owners and -the occupants of a house-trailer camp
in Brooklyn in the case of Stary v. City of BrooklynP that (1) intervening
changes in conditions, such as a great increase in the use and size of trailers
and improvements in their method of construction; (2) the passage of
statewide regulatory laws which did not forbid permanent occupancy of
trailer parks; and (3) the adoption by the Public Health Council of the
comprehensive rules for such camps, all should have the result of nullifying
the municipal ordinance.
1Renker v. Village of Brooklyn, 139 Ohio St. 484, 40 N.E.2d 925 (1942).
2OHio Rnv. CODE §§ 3733.02-3733.05, 3733.99.
' 162 Ohio St 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954).
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The supreme court sustained the continued validity of the ordinance
against all -three objections. It held that while trailers today are often bet-
ter and larger than they were 15 years ago, the very increase in size and
number increased the problems of municipal regulation; that the state
statute on house-trailer camps do niot by -their terms or an their effect pre-
empt the entire field of legislation, particularly in view of the Home Rule
provisions of 'the Ohio Constitution,4 and since the ordinance did not forbid
anything which state statutes permitted, and because, finally, the court
could not say that the 60-day and 90-day provisions of the ordinance were
arbitrary or unreasonable or had no direct relationship to the public health,
morals, safety or welfare.
Zoning - Termination of Prior Non-Conforming Uses
The thorn in the side of the city planner is the non-conforming use
which as already an existence at the time of the enactment of a zoning ordi-
nance. Not only does it prevent the perfect accomplishment of a supposedly
desirable uniformity in the use of the area in which it is located, but it is
also a potential focal point for intrusion of other non-conforming uses into
the area. Advocates of strict zoning provisions have sought legal methods
of eliminating prior non-conforming uses. Ordinances have been upheld
which denied the right to resume a non-conforming use after a period of
non-user, as have -those which deny the right to extend or enlarge an existing
non-conforming use.5
A third possible method proposed has been that of the prohibition or
abolition of the non-conforming use after a reasonable or a fixed length
of -time. The City of Akron adopted a zoning ordinance in 1922 which
provided that a prior non-conforming use should be discontinued when, in
the opinion of the City Council, it had been permitted to exist or continue
"for a reasonable time." Chapman owned real estate which had been con-
tinuously used since 1916 in a manner not in conformity with the 1922
zoning ordinance. In 1950 -the Akron City Council, in an ordinance di-
rected specifically at this property and Chapman's use thereof, declared that
as of January 1, 1951, ,the non-conforming use would have existed for a
reasonable period of time and required such use thereafter to conform.
The supreme court unanimously held that -this constituted an unconsti-
cutional deprivation of Chapman's property rights.6 It intimated that it
might sustain a zoning ordinance which contemplated "the gradual elimina-
'Art. XVIII, Sec. 3.
'State ex rel. City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Stegner. 120 Ohio St. 418, 166 N.E. 226
(1929); 58 AM. Jun. 1026, 1029.
'City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953). See Note,
6 WEST. Ras. L. REv. 182 (1955)
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tion of non-conforming uses within a zoned area" 'if such were accomplished
"without depriving a property owner of a vested property right." This
writer, while not disagreeing with the result reached in this case, fails 'to see
how prior non-conforming uses can compulsorily be gradually eliminated
(absent loss by non-user or destruction by fire or Act of God) without de-
priving the property owner of a vested property right. Under the court's
own definition, ,the right to use the property an a manner at variance with
the ordinance is -the vested property right
Home Rule Cities- Sale of Municipally Owned Real Estate
In Babin v. City of Ashland7 the supreme court had before it -two diffi-
cult and long unsettled problems. Early statutes s of -the state have left in
doubt -the titles .to certain public grounds in cities and towns which were
laid out or incorporated during the first three or four decades of the states
existence. Apparently conflicting provisions9 of the 1831 Act placed the ttle
of lands indicated on town plats to be for street or commons purposes either
in the county or the town. The court reconciled the conflicting sections by
decreeing that .in the case of incorporated towns .the fee was in the -town; in
the case of unincorporated settlements it was in the county as an agency
of the state.
The court was then faced with the problem of reconciling several con-
flicting decisions as -to the alienability of land dedicated to municApalities,
particularly when the dedication was for a particular use or uses. Overrul-
ing Board of Education of Van Wert v. Inhabitants,10 and following Mc-
Mechan v. Board of Education of Richland Township' and cases therein
cited, the court held -that under a statute such as was involved'in the princApal
case, the corporation acquired a fee simple title, not just a mere use, and
upon cessation of the use 'to which the land had been put, could give a fee
simple tile to a purchaser.
The constitutional grantl 2 of all powers of local self government was
heldi3 -to permit the c'ity to convey land no longer needed in it for public
purposes, and because of the fact that -the property being sold did not
destroy or affect in this instance any rights of any abutting landowners1 '
160 Ohio St 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953)
'22 Omio LAws 301 1823), 29 Omio LAws (1831).
'29 Oo LAws 350 §§ 6, 8 (1831).
"18 Ohio St. 221 (1868).
"157 Ohio St. 241, 105 N.E.2d 270 (1952).
'Art. XVIII, Sec. 3.
"Following Hugger v. City of Ironton, 148 Ohio St. 670, 76 N.E.2d 397 (1947)
'See N. Y., Chicago & St. L. Rd. Co. v. Bucsi, 128 Ohio St. 134, 190 N.E. 562
(1934).
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did not require any compensation to other property owners, since all were
affected in the same degree. The compensation to be received by the
municipality was admittedly adequate; no taxes would -have to be levied
to replace any value of the property not received by the muncipality.15
Vacation of Streets - Accretion of Fee
In Vacated Portion to Abutting Parcels of Land
A problem of the tutle to real property which is peculiar to municipal
corporations arose in G eenberg v. L. I. Snodgrass Co.1  Plaintiff owned
improved real estate abutting on its north side upon a public street in Cin-
cinnat1. In deeds from a former -title holder to successive title holders, and
in the deed -to plaintiff from his immediate predecessor in title, -the land
granted had been ".to the south side" of this street upon which plaintiffs
land abutted on the north side. While one of the plaintiff's predecessors held
title, this side street was vacated by the city council. The predecessor hold-
mg title at that tune later sold, but described -the land only to the same
south side of the now vacated street. Later that predecessor sold to de-
fendant the vacated street. Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory
judgment and prayed -that he be declared either to have a fee in the south
half of the vacated street or an easement and right of way theretn. The
common pleas court declared plaintiff to have an easement in the sidewalk
strip and defendant, the grantee of the street portion, the fee in said strip
and an unencumbered fee in the balance.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court to grant to plaintiff an un-
encumbered fee an the entire portion of the street This result was reached
by holding, first, that the law is already well established in Ohio'7 to the
effect that upon the vacation of a street the fee thereto does not revert to the
original dedicator but accretes to the abutting lot owners, subject only to
such rights as other such owners may have in the street as a necessary means
of access to their property.
It then became necessary to determine whether plaintiffs predecessor
•in tide, who owned the premises at the tine of such accretion, retained
the accreted portion of the street at the time 'he sold the improved original
sublot, or whether, on -the other hand, the accreted portion passed with the
principal sublot despite a description of the land which all but expressly
excluded the accreted street The court, following numerous authorities in
other jurisdictions, and noting that although the construction of such a
deed as "strained" -held that "it would require an express declaration, or
Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio 298 (1834) overruled.
"8161 Ohio St. 351, 119 N.E.2d 292 (1954).
"
7Kinnear Mffg. Co. v. Beatty, 65 Ohio St. 264, 62 N.E. 341 (1901).
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